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1 Introduction 
 
When there has been a heavy fall of rain on a newly made and newly 
grassed football field, you do not chase two football teams on to it to play 
a match. 
 
These homely but profound remarks were addressed to our small delegation during 
1994 when we were visiting Hungary to study its recently adopted new Constitution 
and its young Constitutional Court.  The Hungarian Constitution and its 
Constitutional Court were then but five years old.  The remarks were made by the 
leader of the opposition in the Hungarian national legislature.  This wise, seasoned 
political campaigner had been criticising some of the recent judgments of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and his remarks were intended to impress on us that, 
whatever his criticisms might be, he had a deep commitment to the new constitutional 
state and its independent institutions and that the latter should never be harmed for the 
sake of political or other gain.  Our own Constitution, and the constitutional 
democracy it guarantees, is also a newly planted field, little more than five years old. 
 
In this paper I propose noting first some of the features of modern constitutionalism 
and the paradoxes to which they give rise.  I then discuss the need for independent 
constitutional institutions, the substantive independence necessary for their proper 
functioning and areas where they require special support.  I conclude with some 
observations on the paradox of judicial review, appropriate checks and balances on 
courts exercising judicial review and the vital importance of distinguishing between 
honest and informed criticism of judgments and judges and the undermining of the 
judiciary as a constitutional institution. 
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2 Constitutionalism   
 
"Constitutional democracy" connotes a development in the concept of democracy 
which began towards the end of the eighteenth century but which has gained more 
universal recognition only in the last 50 years.  On the one hand, constitutional 
democracy recognises the ancient democratic principle that government of a country 
is based on and legitimated by the will and consent of the governed (or more 
accurately the will and consent of the majority of the governed), which is determined 
by regular multi-party elections based on universal adult franchise.  On the other 
hand, constitutional democracy limits this principle by making the democratically 
elected government and the will of the majority subject to a written constitution and 
the norms embodied in it, which constitution is enshrined as the supreme law of the 
country in question.  An almost universal feature of modern constitutionalism is a Bill 
of Rights which forms part of the Constitution and which is designed to protect and 
enforce individual rights principally, although not exclusively, against the state.  The 
concept of a constitutional democracy, for which the short-hand expression 
"constitutionalism" is sometimes used, is a radical one, the full implications of which 
are not always readily appreciated.  It transforms the regulation of the state and those 
living in it from a political exercise which in principle can be, and in practice 
sometimes is, value free and dictated by the majority, to one which is shaped and 
ruled, both directly and indirectly, by the Constitution and its underlying norms and 
values.  In a constitutional state, the politics of governance can never again be a 
merely pragmatic enterprise aimed exclusively at achieving the various goals 
comprising the government's electoral mandate.  Governance is now subject to the 
Constitution and its values.  
 
Constitutionalism also embodies the principle of the separation of powers but, in 
consequence of the bitter lessons of constitutional history, has come to accept the vital 
need to impose checks and balances on the three arms of the state.  Modern 
constitutionalism has moved strongly away from Plato, who saw the fundamental 
problem of politics in the question:  "Who shall rule the state?"  Instead it asks the 
new and different question:  "How can we so organise political institutions that bad or  
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incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage."
1  This is not an 
expression of cynicism, but of wisdom gained from the painful lessons of human 
fallibility and particularly from the attendant fact that no-one can be completely 
trusted with power and its subtle temptations.  A competent and independent 
judiciary, with the power to review all legislative and executive action which is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, is regarded, almost universally, as the prime and 
most effective check on the legislative and executive arms of the state.  More 
recently, however, it has come to be realised that for the truly effective and 
meaningful operation of constitutionalism other independent state institutions are 
necessary.  The collective objective of these institutions is to ensure that the 
Constitution in fact produces what it proclaims;  that constitutionalism becomes a way 
of life in all institutional structures. 
 
An invariable consequence of constitutionalism is the tension between the will of the 
majority, and its representatives, on the one hand, and the normative control of the 
Constitution, exercised through the courts and other institutions, on the other.  This 
tension, one might even call it a paradox, cannot ever be completely or permanently 
resolved, an inevitability which is, as yet, inadequately appreciated and I will touch 
on it later in this paper. 
 
3  The Need for Independent Institutions 
 
The South African Constitution has clearly designated the judiciary as the prime 
upholder and enforcer of the Constitution.  While prescribing certain constitutional 
functions for all courts, the Constitution has conferred a special role in this regard on 
the Constitutional Court.  There are particular historical and fundamental 
jurisprudential reasons for this which fall outside the ambit of this paper.  Apart from 
those matters in respect of which it has exclusive jurisdiction,
2 the Constitutional 
Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters,
3 which includes issues 
                                                 
1 See  Popper  Open Society 120-121. 
2  Enumerated in s 167(4). 
3  S 167(3)(a) of the 1996 Constitution ("the Constitution").   
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connected with a decision on a constitutional matter;
4  decisions on whether a matter 
is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is connected with a decision on a 
constitutional matter;
5  and any issue involving the interpretation, protection or 
enforcement of the Constitution.
6  In fact the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction is 
even more extensive than the above might superficially suggest, because it also 
includes the final decision whether, in interpreting any legislation and developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum has correctly 
"promote[d] the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."
7 
 
The Constitution has, however, gone further in its commitment to strengthening and 
entrenching constitutionalism and, drawing on the often sad experiences of young 
democracies in the past, wisely makes provision for a variety of independent state 
institutions whose purpose is to "strengthen constitutional democracy in the 
Republic".
8  They are the Public Protector;  the Human Rights Commission;  the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities;  the Gender Commission;  the Auditor-General and the 
Electoral Commission.  Apart from these state institutions the Constitution also makes 
provision for other independent bodies designed to play an important checking and 
balancing role.  So, for example, in relation to local government, it mandates the 
establishment of an independent authority for the determination of municipal 
boundaries,
9 provides for a Financial and Fiscal Commission which is independent, 
impartial and subject only to the Constitution and the law
10 and a Reserve Bank which 
must perform its functions independently and without fear, favour or prejudice.
11 
 
One may legitimately ask why it is necessary to make provision for these additional 
independent institutions.  The object is clearly stated by the Constitution in relation to 
the independent state institutions referred to in section 181 and is to be inferred for 
the others, namely, to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic.  From a 
                                                 
4    S 167(3)(b) and (c). 
5    S 167 (3)(c). 
6    S 167(7). 
7    S 39(2) read with ss 173 and 167(7).  
8    S 181(1). 
9   S 155(3)(b). 
10 S  220. 
11 S  224(2).  
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functional point of view this purpose, once stated, strikes one as obvious.  Yet it is a 
truism not always appreciated.  The remarkable success of our 1994 and 1999 
elections, in the sense that they were substantially free and fair and were accepted as 
legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the electorate across all political 
boundaries, can only be ascribed to the  competent functioning of the Electoral 
Commission, whose independence has been guaranteed by both the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions and which was jealously asserted by the Electoral Commission itself.  
We tend to take this for granted, forgetting in the process how many emerging 
democracies have stumbled at the hurdle of their first elections, because the results 
are not accepted as true or legitimate by a suspicious and newly liberated electorate.  
In my view the significance of these institutions goes even deeper.  A homely 
metaphor has on occasion been used to describe the Constitution as comprising the 
building blocks for a constitutional democracy, but it warns that they need a 
pervading human rights ethos to act as the mortar binding these blocks securely 
together;  without such mortar, the structure will remain unstable and liable to topple 
in severe political storms.  The proper functioning of the independent constitutional 
institutions, including the court system, is vitally important for creating and sustaining 
such an ethos of constitutionalism amongst the inhabitants of the Republic.  The 
regular effective functioning of these institutions assists in establishing the habits of 
constitutionalism.  It advances constitutionalism from an exercise of the mind to a 
living practice, even a ritual if you will.  Practices and rituals in the life of a nation, as 
well as in that of an individual, are important.  When a nation is seriously shaken by 
the storms of political life, the demands of the moment can place principle under 
threat.  At such times the ingrained and almost instinctual habits and rituals of 
constitutionalism may be the last line of defence for the Constitution.  The inculcation 
of these practices and habits are therefore of great importance.  It is similarly 
important to resists all attempts to undermine these institutions and the habits of 
constitutionalism. 
 
4  Substantive Independence of these Institutions 
 
In relation to the judiciary and the other independent state institutions to which 
reference has been made, the Constitution makes explicit provision for their  
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protection and thereby indirectly for the development of these habits of 
constitutionalism.  The independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the 
courts are protected both by negative and positive injunctions in the Constitution.
12  
The courts are stated to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law;  no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts;  and 
organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the 
courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and 
effectiveness.
13  Likewise the independent state institutions mentioned are declared by 
the Constitution to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law;  
other organs of state are obliged by the Constitution, through legislative and other 
measures, to protect them and to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness, and no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of 
these institutions.
14  The protection and support given to these institutions by the 
Constitution, is very similar to that given to the courts.  One important distinction is 
to be noted.  In the case of the courts the Constitution provides that they "are subject 
only to the Constitution and the law" and no provision is made for them to be 
accountable to any other organ of state or any other institution or person for that 
matter.  If the term accountability is applicable at all to the courts, about which I have 
substantial reservations, then courts are "accountable" only to the Constitution and the 
law, both directly through the Constitution and indirectly through the judicial oath of 
office.  A judge (that is to say a judicial officer on the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Courts and the courts of a similar status to the 
High Courts) may only be removed from office if such judge "suffers from an 
incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct", has been found as 
a fact to fall into one or more of those categories by the Judicial Services Commission 
and a resolution of the National Assembly adopted with a supporting vote of at least 
two thirds of its members has called for such judge's removal.  Provided, therefore, 
that a judge does not suffer from incapacity, is not grossly incompetent and is not 
guilty of gross misconduct, she or he is not accountable to any organ of state.  By 
contrast, the independent institutions envisaged in section 181 are expressly made 
accountable to the National Assembly and are obliged to report on their activities and 
                                                 
12  See s 165(2), (3) and (4). 
13    Id.  
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the performance of their functions to the Assembly at least once a year.
15 
 
The independence of state institutions falling outside the legislature and the executive 
is particularly vulnerable in the area of fiscal and bureaucratic control.  While their 
formal independence may at all times be scrupulously recognised by the legislature 
and the executive, their substantive independence can easily be undermined by fiscal 
starvation and their ability to function properly impeded by bureaucratic 
administrative obstruction or obfuscation or even, quite innocently, by a lack of 
appreciation of what the Constitution demands from public administration in support 
of these institutions.  If the institutions I am discussing are to function truly 
independently and to fulfil properly the significant roles assigned to them by the 
Constitution, safeguards must be devised and implemented in these areas.  While 
certain mechanisms may assist, acceptable independence will only be permanently 
achieved, I believe, if the right constitutional habits are developed by the organs of 
state and all citizens come to realise the importance of their own watch-dog functions. 
 
Substantive independence of the courts as required by the Constitution implies much, 
but chiefly it connotes three things.  Firstly, the training and ethical fibre of judges 
must be such that they can and will be beholden only to the Constitution and its 
values in performing their judicial duties and not be influenced by other 
considerations and pressures.  Secondly, the judiciary must enjoy reasonable financial 
security and adequate working conditions in order to attract candidates to judicial 
office with the requisite training and ethical fibre and also in order to remove the need 
and temptation, once they are appointed, to look elsewhere in order to maintain an 
adequate standard of living and in so doing risk sacrificing their independence.   
Thirdly, their independence must be effectively protected by the Constitution so that 
no-one, whether within or outside state structures, is able to interfere improperly with 
the discharge of their duties. 
 
In order for all these aspects of judicial independence to be achieved, the courts 
require adequate financial and administrative resources.  Crucial in this regard is that 
                                                                                                                                            
14  S 181(2) - (4). 
15  S 181(5).    
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the process whereby these resources are supplied and controlled should reinforce the 
independence of the courts and not undermine it.  In pursuance of its obligations 
under section 165(4) of the Constitution,
16 Parliament has, for example, enacted the 
Constitutional Court Complementary Act ("the CC Complementary Act").  Apart from 
other measures designed to assist the Constitutional Court and to strengthen its 
independence and effectiveness, the CC Complementary Act provides, most 
commendably, in section 15: 
 
(1)  Expenditure in connection with the administration and 
functioning of the Court shall be defrayed from monies 
appropriated by Parliament.   
(2)  Requests for the funds needed for the administration and 
functioning of the Court, as determined by the President of the 
Court after consultation with the Minister, shall be addressed to 
Parliament by the Minister in the manner prescribed for the 
budgetary processes of departments of state. 
 
Two significant points are to be noted.  The first is that the funds needed for the 
administration and functioning of the Constitutional Court are determined by the 
President of the Court and by no-one else.  While the President of the Court has to 
consult with the Minister he is not bound by the views expressed by the Minister, nor 
is he obliged to obtain the approval or consent of the Minister.  Secondly the Minister 
is obliged to address to Parliament a request for such funds as so determined by the 
President in the above manner.  Accordingly, the funding for the administration and 
functioning of the Constitutional Court is not merely a line item in the budget of the 
Department of Justice in regard to which the Court might make recommendations 
only, but would have little control over what is submitted to Parliament.  In this way 
Parliament has gone a long way to securing the independence of the Constitutional 
Court in regard to its financial needs.  The question which arises is whether similar 
provision ought not to be made in regard to the rest of the judiciary.   
 
                                                 
16  Which obliges all organs of state, through legislative and other measures to "assist and protect the 
courts to ensure the independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts."  
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Quite clearly Parliament must, even in a constitutional state, control the budgetary 
processes and expenditure of departments of state and also of the judicial arm of the 
state.  As far as the latter is concerned, this is a sensitive area in the terrain of the 
separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary which requires the 
greatest circumspection and regard for comity between them.  The Constitutional 
Court must not intrude, or be seen to intrude on the fiscal and financial powers of 
Parliament.
17  At the same time Parliament must execute these powers in conformity 
with all its obligations under the Constitution and not in a way which will harm the 
independence of the judiciary.  The same is true of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive in regard to the administration and functioning of the 
courts.  In areas where the contours of these relationships are not spelt out in 
legislation, and perhaps cannot easily be spelt out, there is need for sound habits and 
practices of constitutionalism to develop as soon as possible. 
 
5  Where These Institutions Need Particular Support 
 
For a number of reasons it has been difficult for these habits and practices to develop. 
  With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the transition to a constitutional 
democracy is proving to be slower, more complex and more difficult than initially 
contemplated and that the coming into operation of the 1996 Constitution did not 
complete this final stage, it merely introduced it.  While this may be a sobering 
thought, it also reminds us of how thankful we ought to be for the great deal which 
has already been achieved with relatively little bloodshed and it focuses our attention 
on the importance of what still has to be done.  The process of changing from a racist 
oligarchy to a constitutional democracy has presented legal, technical, logistic and 
resource problems which would have been daunting for a country with financial and 
other resources many times greater than South Africa's.  The extent to which and the 
complexity with which institutionalised apartheid had invaded the legal fabric of 
society has been underestimated.  When the interim Constitution, as it was obliged to 
do, at one and the same time imploded the existing provincial and local government 
structures and replaced them with structures which could only take effect 
                                                 
17  For example under chapter 13 of the Constitution.  
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incrementally, it made technical legal demands on the legislatures and their technical 
draftspersons which bordered on the impossible.  Provincial governments, which have 
instruments on their statute books which are clearly inconsistent with the Constitution 
or are obliged to administer such instruments, have to tread extremely warily before 
discarding such instruments and must make certain that it is within their legislative 
competence to do so.  Under the Bill of Rights, for example, everyone has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law
18 under circumstances where equality 
"includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms"
19 and there is an 
obligation on the government to promote the achievement of equality,
20 which 
obligation the government is constitutionally mandated to discharge diligently and 
without delay.
21  Any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution became invalid, 
at the latest, when the 1996 Constitution came into effect.
22  There is an obligation on 
government to ensure that such invalidity does not leave a lacuna in the law, which in 
turn commits government to a massive remedial legislative programme.  For the first 
time in the history of this country the legislatures and executives at all levels of 
government, represent all the people democratically and are constitutionally equally 
committed to all the people.  The pressures on them, particularly in the national 
sphere, are enormous.  Nevertheless, all South Africans must still be vigilant to 
ensure, from the outset, that all state organs develop these habits and practices of 
constitutionalism and that they do not, whether by omission, error or otherwise 
endanger the independence of our independent state institutions by neglecting their 
constitutional obligations under section 181(3) "through legislative and other 
measures [to] assist and protect these institutions to ensure [their] independence, 
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness." 
 
How easily these obligations can come to be neglected is illustrated by the 
Constitutional Court's judgment in the New National Party Bar Code case
23 which 
dealt amongst other things with the independence of the Electoral Commission ("the 
Commission").  The Court's judgment points out that, where necessary,  
                                                 
18  S 9(1) of the Constitution. 
19    S 9(2). 
20    S 9(2).  
21    S 237. 
22    See the supremacy clauses, s 4(1) of the interim Constitution and s 2 of the 1996 Constitution;  see 
also Ferreira v Levin;  Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) par [27-30].  
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… old legislative and policy arrangements, public administration practices 
and budgetary conventions must be adjusted to be brought in line with the 
new constitutional prescripts.
24 
 
The Departments of Home Affairs and State Expenditure were found to have acted in 
a way which constituted a serious slight to the dignity and integrity of the 
Commission
25 and that the Department of State Expenditure and the Minister of 
Finance had failed to appreciate the true import of the requirements of the 
Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act regarding the independence of the 
Commission and that the Commission was accountable to the National Assembly and 
not the executive.
26  The Court emphasised the importance of both financial and 
administrative independence: 
 
[I]t is necessary to make a distinction between two factors, both of which 
... are relevant to "independence".  The first is "financial independence".  
This implies the ability to have access to funds reasonably required to 
enable the Commission to discharge the functions it is obliged to perform 
under the Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act.  This does not 
mean that it can set its own budget.  Parliament does that.  What it does 
mean, however, is that Parliament must consider what is reasonably 
required by the Commission and deal with requests for funding rationally, 
in the light of other national interests.  It is for Parliament, and not the 
executive arm of government, to provide for funding reasonably sufficient 
to enable the Commission to carry out its constitutional mandate.  The 
Commission must accordingly be afforded an adequate opportunity to 
defend its budgetary requirements before Parliament or its relevant 
committees. 
 
The second factor, "administrative independence", implies that there will 
                                                                                                                                            
23   New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC). 
24   Id par 78. 
25  Id par 85. 
26  Id par 100.  
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be control [by the Commission] over those matters directly connected with 
the functions which the Commission has to perform under the Constitution 
and the Act.  ... The department cannot tell the Commission how to 
conduct the registration, whom to employ, and so on;  but if the 
Commission asks the government for assistance to provide personnel to 
take part in the registration process, government must provide such 
assistance if it is able to do so.  If not, the Commission must be put in 
funds to enable it to what is necessary.
27  (Emphasis supplied) 
 
These are general principles applicable to the independence and function of all 
independent institutions. 
 
6  The Paradox of Judicial Review and Appropriate Checks and Balances 
 
The tension or paradox which constitutionalism creates manifests itself most sharply 
in the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the other two arms of the 
state at national level, because it is the Constitutional Court which, in the final 
instance determines whether the actions of the legislature and the executive are 
consistent with the Constitution and, if not, invalidates them.  For the Constitutional 
Court, in this context, to fulfil its role as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution it 
must be independent, not only of these organs of state, but also of the political 
majority.  Its members cannot be elected, because that would imply that the Court 
owed an allegiance or accountability to the political majority or other elector in 
question.  On the other hand, it is seen as undemocratic for a body which is not 
elected to be in a position to overrule the expressed will of the political 
representatives of the majority.  This paradox, although particularly striking in the 
case of the Constitutional Court, exists in respect of all our courts and makes the 
method of appointing judicial officers particularly important in order to ensure at the 
same time, and as far as this is practically possible, both their independence and their 
legitimacy.  This brings me to the point I want to stress particularly.  The judiciary is 
not, and ought not to be seen as, an arm of the state which has been exempted from all 
                                                 
27  Id pars 98-99.  
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checks and balances.  At the same time it is important, particularly so for the general 
public, to appreciate that the checks and balances on the judiciary are not the same as 
in the case of the legislature and the executive.  In the case of the latter the checks and 
balances are principally through the Constitution, as enforced by the courts, and 
through the political process.  In the case of the courts these checks and balances 
cannot be through the political process, for this would undermine the independence of 
the judiciary, which in turn would seriously undermine the judiciary's crucial function 
of being a check on the legislature and executive.  It is therefore unfortunate that the 
expression "accountability" has been used in relation to the judiciary, for it suggests, 
wrongly and misleadingly, that the checks and balances on the judiciary are political 
in nature. 
 
At the same time I should like to stress, as clearly as I can, that the judiciary is not, 
and does not regard itself as being, above the Constitution or exempt from checks and 
balances.  It must at the same time be appreciated that the checks and balances on the 
judiciary are different and in most cases also operate indirectly.  Their main features 
seem to me to be the following: 
 
(a)  In the first place it is possible for the appointment process to be such that it 
ensures that persons are appointed to the judiciary who are suitably qualified, 
both intellectually and ethically, to serve the Constitution and the law;  who 
have the commitment to do so without qualification and who will accordingly 
regard their oaths of judicial office as being unconditionally binding on their 
consciences. 
(b)  Second, all courts function in the most transparent manner possible, not only 
in the conduct of their hearings but in furnishing reasons for the conclusions 
and judgments they reach.  The obligations to furnish reasons for their 
judgments, such reasons becoming more comprehensive the higher the 
particular court is in the hierarchy of courts, is probably the most powerful 
mechanism to ensure that courts operate under and within the constitution and 
the law.  These reasoned judgments are public documents and open to the 
scrutiny of colleagues in all other courts, to other lawyers in all branches of 
the legal professions and to all members of the public.  They are open to  
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criticism by anyone who cares to do so.  There is no limit to such criticism, 
provided it does not misrepresent the content or conclusions of the judgment, 
the facts or the law on which it is based or wrongly ascribes dishonest or 
improper motives to the court which has delivered the judgment.  Critical 
rationalism is, I believe, the best and safest method of arriving at the truth 
generally, which is one of the reasons why freedom of expressions is such a 
fundamental liberty.  Critical rationalism is no less important in applying and 
developing the law and keeping a check on those who perform this function. 
(c)  Third, provision is made for the judgments of all courts (except those of the 
Constitutional Court and those of the Supreme Court of Appeal in matters 
which are not of a constitutional nature, in the sense already described) to be 
taken on appeal to a higher court where they can be corrected.  Courts of 
appeal have never hesitated to correct judgments, where this is warranted, nor 
to criticise judicial officers where they have acted incorrectly or behaved 
improperly.  
(d)  Fourth, in the case of the Constitutional Court in particular, from which there 
is no further appeal, the opportunity, I would even call it a constitutional duty, 
for public scrutiny and criticism becomes all-important as a safeguard.  The 
efficacy of informed and rational public scrutiny and criticism, as a means of 
legitimately "checking" judicial conduct, especially of the highest courts, must 
not be underestimated, particularly not in a constitutional state which has 
made the radical shift away from the Westminster parliamentary supremacy of 
the past.  On the assumption that the appointment and promotion procedures 
work adequately, the judges on the highest courts, through their training and 
experience, will have become steeped in the habits of rational analysis, 
argument, criticism and hypothesis formation.  This will have become an 
integral, I would venture to say an inseparable, part of their legal thinking.  
Few judges would confess to actually liking criticism, but the better informed 
and the more rationally structured criticism is, the less these judicial habits are 
able to resist following the arguments.  Criticism which is based, whether 
intentionally or not, on a false substratum of fact or law, is counterproductive. 
  If public debate is regularly premised on such false substratum, whoever 
might be responsible for supplying it, the natural tendency is to ignore such  
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debate as unreliable and in this way the  good is lost with the bad. 
(e)  Fifth, in extreme cases judges may be removed from office for incapacity, 
gross incompetence and gross misconduct in the manner already alluded to. 
(f) Lastly,  the  Constitution makes provision for national legislation to provide for 
procedures for dealing with complaints about judicial officers.  Such 
legislation will have to comply with the Constitution and not interfere with 
judicial independence itself.  There is no reason to think that procedures 
cannot be devised which, while not harming judicial independence, can deal 
appropriately with judicial misconduct so as to be an effective check on 
unconstitutional judicial actions.  Attention is already being given to such 
legislation. 
 
While informed and rational criticism of the judiciary performs an important 
constitutional function, the deliberate undermining of this indispensable independent 
institution comes close to treason.  While judges are not sacrosanct, the institution 
which they serve is.  By and large, following the exemplary lead given by President 
Mandela, legislative and executive organs have, almost without exception, been 
scrupulous in their conduct towards the Constitutional Court as a constitutional 
institution.  The example of President Mandela I refer to above relates to his response 
to the judgment of the Constitutional Court dealing with the provisions of section 16A 
of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 ("the LGTA") which purported 
to give the President the power to amend the LGTA by proclamation.
28  The President, 
relying on section 16A and legal advice he had been given, purported to amend the 
LGTA by means of two proclamations.  The matter was politically sensitive and had 
potentially far-reaching implications for the holding of local government elections in 
the Cape Town metropolitan area.  The Court held that the provisions of section16A 
of the LGTA were constitutionally invalid and that the President had acted 
unconstitutionally in purporting to amend the provisions of the LGTA by proclamation 
under the authority of section 16A.  The same day on which the Court's judgment was 
delivered, President Mandela appeared on the public media.  He explained that he had 
acted in good faith and in reliance on legal advice given to him.  He did not question 
                                                 
28  Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC).  
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the correctness of the Court's decision but, more importantly, he stressed that the 
Court was the final constitutional arbiter on the constitutionality of his presidential 
actions, that the Constitution was supreme and that the Court's judgment had 
unconditionally to be followed. 
 
It is somewhat paradoxical that the only substantial attacks on the Constitutional 
Court, calculated to impair it as an institution, have come from political minorities 
who, one would have thought, would be particularly anxious to rely on such an 
institution to protect its individual rights against the political majority.  The most 
significant example of such an attack is that referred to in the Sarfu judgments of the 
Constitutional Court.
29  The recusal application launched by doctor Luyt against 
members of the Constitutional Court was unprecedented.  It attacked the integrity of 
every member of the Constitutional Court, "contrasting their integrity and courage 
(perceived to be flawed) with that of the Judge [in the High Court] (who was said to 
have shown remarkable courage in giving the judgment that he did)."
30  T h e  
implication of the allegations against all ten members of the Court was stated in the 
recusal judgment to be  - 
 
... that the ten members of this Court had created the impression that they 
had already decided to uphold the appeal of the President at a time when 
the record had not been filed and before argument on behalf of any of the 
parties had been heard.  Having so decided, the further consequence of 
this impression was that they made interlocutory rulings aimed at 
upholding the President's appeal.  The suggestion that a court, without 
having seen the record or heard argument, would engineer its 
interlocutory rulings to favour a decision it had already taken, is 
extraordinary and contemptuous.
31 
 
In the judgment on the merits the following was said of similar tactics: 
                                                 
29   The President of the Republic of South Africa v The South African Rugby Football Union  CCT 
16/98.  The first Constitutional Court judgment (the forum judgment) is reported in 1999 (2) 
BCLR 175 (CC), the second (the recusal judgment) is reported in 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC) and 
the third (the judgment on the merits) was delivered on 10 September 1999 but, as at the date of 
drafting this paper, had not yet been reported.   
30  The judgment on the merits, above n 29 at par 251.  
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The tactics adopted by Dr Luyt bear the hallmark of spin-doctoring by a 
respondent who, knowing that the appeal might succeed, lays the ground 
to discredit the Court with the object of undermining a decision which 
might go against him.  The appellants might succeed, but it would be a 
pyrrhic victory, secured by a dishonest President from a compliant 
Court.
32 
 
For the sake of constitutionalism, it is essential to distinguish between, on the one 
hand, honest and informed criticism of the judgments and behaviour of judges and, on 
the other, conduct calculated to undermine the judiciary as an institution. 
 
One of the reciprocal obligations which a constitutional democracy imposes on all its 
subjects is to support the independent constitutional institutions, as constitutional 
institutions, not only vocally at the level of intellectual abstraction, but by actively 
working to establish the habits of constitutionalism in all societal structures and 
societal interaction.  Our constitutional playing fields are well constructed and 
planted, but require careful tending. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
31    Recusal judgment, above n 29 at par 54. 
32  Judgment on the merits, above n 29 at par 255.  
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